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THE UNDOING OF MANDATORY FREE EXERCISE ACCOM-
MODATION-Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court has struggled to find a fair and consistent
approach to cases in which an individual's religious practice conflicts with a generally
applicable law. Prior to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
the Court used a balancing approach to determine whether the state's interests in denying
an exemption to a criminal law justified the burden that the law placed on an individual's
religious practice. After Smith, the state must show only that the law is generally applica-
ble and does not directly target a religious practice. This new approach underprotects
religious conduct because it provides no guarantee against unnecessary infringements on
religious freedom. By following certain objective guidelines, such as framing the state's
interests narrowly and making an inquiry into the burden on the claimant, courts can
apply the balancing approach in a fair and consistent manner, thus providing substantial
protection for religious conduct.
In the 1990 decision Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court determined that
a state may constitutionally prohibit the sacramental use of peyote by
members of the Native American Church.' To arrive at this conclu-
sion, the Court abandoned its balancing approach to free exercise
claims and held that criminal laws that burden a religious practice
need not be justified by a compelling state interest.' As long as a crim-
inal law is generally applicable and does not directly target a religious
practice, the Court will not use the free exercise clause of the United
States Constitution as a basis for requiring an exemption to the law.3
Perhaps more importantly, however, the majority strongly suggested
that this rule will be applied to other types of generally applicable state
regulations as well as to criminal laws.4
The abandonment of the balancing approach in Smith is the Court's
latest and perhaps most threatening move away from court-mandated
free exercise accommodation. Mandatory accommodation is based on
the premise that when religious conscience conflicts with a govern-
ment obligation or prohibition, the government sometimes may have
to give way.5 In Smith, the Court recognized that exemptions to crim-
inal laws may sometimes be necessary to protect religious conduct, but
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
2. See id. at 1603.
3. Id. at 1599-1600; U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... ). This Note focuses
primarily on the free exercise clause, but in many instances establishment clause concerns are
implicated.
4. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605-06.
5. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. Rv. 146, 152-53 (1987).
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delegated this task to legislatures.6 This solution provides no guaran-
tee that religious exemptions will be granted when a practice is bur-
dened. To protect individual choice in religion, courts must be able to
occasionally step in and mandate exemptions, based on a consistent
and fair formulation of the balancing approach.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF
ACCOMMODATION: 1878-1989
The religion clauses of the first amendment were enacted with two
primary goals in mind: first and foremost, to prevent religious coer-
cion and, second, to encourage religious pluralism.7 The desire to pre-
vent coercion stemmed from the framers' experience with the
establishment of the Anglican Church, which Thomas Jefferson and
others denounced as "sinful and tyrannical." 8 The goal of promoting
religious pluralism can be traced to James Madison's belief that reli-
gious diversity was necessary to guard society, and especially the
rights of the minority, from oppression.9 Madison believed that a
large number of religious sects would make religious rights more
secure because it would prevent any one group from dominating and
oppressing others.1 ° He also believed that government should not
interfere with religion "unless under color of religion the preservation
of equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly
endangered." "
A. Pre-1940s: Reynolds v. United States-No Religious Exemptions
to Secular Laws
The Court's early interpretations of the free exercise clause did little
to promote religious diversity.12 In Reynolds v. United States, 13 for
example, the Court held that a Mormon was not entitled to an exemp-
tion from state criminal laws prohibiting polygamy, even though his
6. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
7. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 20.
8. Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1574
(1989).
9. The Federalist No. 51, at 283 (J. Madison) (M. Chadwick ed. 1987).
10. Id.
11. M. Malbin, Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment
21-22 (1978).
12. Smith, Getting Off On the Wrong Foot and Back On Again: A Reexamination of the
History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the
Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 635 (1984).
13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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religion encouraged the practice.' 4 The Court held that although
Congress had no legislative power over opinion, it could' regulate
actions which were "in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.""5
The Court in Reynolds reasoned that the free exercise clause did not
require the government to accommodate religious practices. 16 Free-
dom of religion was narrowly viewed as freedom from persecution for
religious beliefs.17 It did not encompass freedom from laws whose
purpose was secular, regardless of the law's effect on a religious
practice. 1 8
B. The Departure from Reynolds
Cantwell v. Connecticut marked the beginning of the Court's grad-
ual departure from Reynolds. 19 In Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness was
charged with soliciting contributions for a religious cause without a
permit.2' The Court held that the state's power to deny permits was
an unconstitutional infringement on religious and other constitutional
freedoms.21 According to the Court in Cantwell, when a regulation
infringes on religious and other constitutional freedoms, it is constitu-
tionally invalid22 unless the regulated conduct presents a "clear and
present danger" to a substantial state interest and the statute is "nar-
rowly drawn."23  Despite these inroads on the Reynolds rule, how-
ever, the Court did not actually move away from Reynolds until the
1960s.
In 1961, the Court stated for the first time that if a neutral law
burdens a religious practice, the law is constitutional only if the state
cannot accomplish its purpose by less burdensome means.24 In Braun-
feld v. Brown,2" two Orthodox Jews, whose faith prohibited them from
working on Saturdays, requested an exemption from the Philadelphia
14. Id. at 166-68.
15. Id. at 164.
16. Id. at 166.
17. Galanter, Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv.
217, 235.
18. Id.
19. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
20. Id. at 301-02.
21. Id. at 305. Note, however, that Cantwell dealt with an infringement on both free speech
and free exercise, which may explain why the Reynolds rule still controlled free exercise decisions
until the 1960s.
22. Id. at 303-04.
23. Id. at 311.
24. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
25. Id.
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Sunday closing law.2 6 The law limited them to a five-day work week,
putting them at a substantial economic disadvantage in relation to
other merchants who were able to work a six-day week.2 7 The Court
upheld the law on the basis that the state's interest in a uniform day of
rest could not be accomplished by any other means.28 The Court
acknowledged, however, that where less intrusive means are available
to the state, the state may be required to use them.29
C. The Balancing Approach: Sherbert and Yoder
In 1963, the Court formulated a test which incorporated elements
from both Braunfeld and Cantwell and became the basis for deciding
free exercise claims until the mid-1980s. 3° In Sherbert v. Verner, 31 the
Court held that a state could not deny unemployment benefits to a
Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for refusing to work on Satur-
days, the church's Sabbath. 32 To reach this conclusion, the Court
required the state to justify the denial by showing a compelling inter-
est33 which was being secured by the least restrictive means available
to the state.34
Sherbert opened the door to claims for exemptions from criminal
laws. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,35 the Court held that Amish parents
could not be criminally convicted of violating compulsory attendance
laws for high school students.36 To determine whether the Amish reli-
gion was burdened by the attendance laws, the Court thoroughly
examined the Amish interests at stake, including tenets of the Amish
religion, its history and values, and the devastating effect that
mandatory high school attendance could have on the sect.37
Against these interests, the Court balanced the state's interests in
denying the requested exemption, stating that "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legit-
imate claims to the free exercise of religion."38 The Court determined
26. Id. at 601-02.
27. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 607-08.
29. Id. at 607 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
30. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 410.
33. Id. at 403.
34. Id. at 407.
35. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
36. Id. at 234.
37. Id. at 210-12.
38. Id. at 215.
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that the state's interest in requiring the Amish children to attend
school until the tenth grade was weak, especially considering that the
Amish trained their own children to become productive members of
the Amish community.39 In addition, Amish practices presented no
threat to "the public safety, peace, order, or welfare .... ."I The
Court concluded that requiring Amish children to attend high school
could cause the Amish great damage, and that the parents should
therefore be exempted from the law.41
D. Free Exercise Challenges to Drug Laws
Yoder is the only case in which the United States Supreme Court
has granted an exemption to a criminal law based on the free exercise
clause. Other courts, however, have used the balancing test to grant
exemptions to criminal laws. In People v. Woody,42 for example, the
California Supreme Court held that the state's interest in prohibiting
Native American Church peyote use was not sufficiently compelling to
override the defendant's free exercise rights.43 The court examined
Native American Church peyote use in detail, stressing the history of
the church and the fact that peyote may be its "theological heart."'
On the state's side, the court determined that the possible harmful
effects of peyote use were unsubstantiated, and that the state's fears of
fraudulent claims were speculative.45
Other claims for religious drug use have been rejected by the lower
courts.4 6 In Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration,47 for example,
members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church had been convicted of
various marijuana offenses, including an attempt to import twenty
tons of marijuana into the United States.4" Despite the church's use of
marijuana as a sacrament, the court refused to grant Olsen an exemp-
tion from federal marijuana laws.49 Because of the magnitude of ille-
gal trafficking in marijuana and the burden that an exemption would
place on enforcement of federal marijuana laws, the court determined
39. Id. at 212, 228-29.
40. Id. at 230.
41. Id. at 234.
42. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
43. 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
44. Id. at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
45. Id. at 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
46. Some lower courts have also refused to grant an exemption for Native American Church
peyote use. See, eg., State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1929); State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967).
47. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1926 (1990).
48. Id. at 1459.
49. Id.
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that the state's interest in denying an exemption for religious use was
sufficient to override Olsen's interests in using the drug as a
sacrament.
50
E. The Move Away From the Balancing Approach
Although after Sherbert the United States Supreme Court used the
balancing test to deal with free exercise claims, the Court was gener-
ally reluctant to grant exemptions even when the state's interest was
fairly weak.5' Finally, in the 1980s, the Court began to retreat from
the balancing approach altogether.
In 1982, the Court rendered an opinion that changed the required
showing on the part of the state.52 In United States v. Lee, 53 the Court
held that an Amish farmer/employer was not entitled to an exemption
from the social security program, even though participation in the pro-
gram violated his religious beliefs. 4 In balancing the interests, the
Court accepted the claimant's assertion that his religious practice was
burdened and then discussed the state's interests at length. 5
The Court focused on the importance of the social security system
in general and the need for universal participation.56 Instead of
inquiring whether the statute was the "least restrictive means" of
achieving the state's interest, the Court discussed whether granting the
exemption to the Amish would "unduly interfere" with fulfillment of
the state's interest. 57 The Court concluded that exemptions of any
kind would disrupt the program, and that the Amish employer there-
fore did not have a constitutional right to be exempted from the
statute.58
In addition to easing the state's burden in Lee, the Court began to
designate areas in which the balancing test did not apply. In Bowen v.
Roy, 59 the Court declined to grant an exemption to members of the
Native American Church who believed that using a social security
number to identify their daughter would destroy her spirit." The
50. Id. at 1463-64; see infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing factors that
affect the strength of the state's interest in denying an exemption for religious drug use).
51. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1194 n.41 (2d ed. 1988).
52. Id. at 1261.
53. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
54. Id. at 257, 260.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 258-60.
57. Id. at 259; see L. TRIBE, supra note 51, at 1261.
58. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.
59. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
60. Id. at 708.
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Court reasoned that a policy decision by the government was entitled
to substantial deference and that the government therefore did not
need to demonstrate a compelling interest in denying the exemption.61
In 1988, the Court extended the Roy decision to include all regula-
tions of government programs that incidentally burden religious inter-
ests. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 62 a
number of organizations and individuals sought to enjoin the Forest
Service from building a road through an area that traditionally had
been used by several Native American tribes for religious purposes. 63
The Court compared the building of a road on public land to the gov-
ernment's use of a social security number in Roy, and held that the
incidental effects of government programs did not require the govern-
ment to show a compelling interest.61 As in Roy, the Court in Lyng
distinguished cases involving criminal sanctions, suggesting that a case
involving coercion would still require the state to show a compelling
interest.65
After Lyng, the free exercise clause provided potential relief in three
primary contexts: (1) where a law directly and intentionally targeted a
particular religion; (2) where an unemployment benefits statute had a
mechanism for individualized exemption (Sherbert); and (3) where a
particular form of religious conduct was either criminally compelled
or forbidden (Yoder). Although the Court did not explicitly overrule
Yoder in Smith, the Court dealt with and eliminated the application of
the free exercise clause in the third context.66
F. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith
In Smith,67 a member of the Native American Church was dis-
charged from his employment as a drug counselor after taking peyote
61. Id.
62. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
63. Id. at 443.
64. Id. at 449, 458.
65. See id. at 448-49.
66. Instead of overruling Yoder, the Court distinguished it as a hybrid case in which other
constitutional concerns in addition to free exercise were implicated. See infra text accompanying
note 78.
67. 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985) (Smith 1), aff'd, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986)
(Smith 11), cert. granted and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 1444 (Smith II1), on remand, 307 Or. 68, 763
P.2d 146 (1988) (Smith IV), rev'd, 11 0 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (Smith P). Smith was decided in the
Oregon courts together with a companion case involving another member of the Native
American Church who was discharged bythe same employer for the same reasons. See Black v.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451 (1986).
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as part of a ceremony conducted by the church.68 Because his dis-
charge was based on work-related misconduct, the Oregon Employ-
ment Appeals Board (EAB) denied him the right to unemployment
compensation benefits. 69 The Oregon Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the EAB order 7' and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that a denial of benefits based on religious peyote use violated
the first amendment of the United States Constitution.7'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded
to determine whether religious use of peyote was criminal in Oregon.7z
The Court reasoned that if religious peyote use was criminal in Ore-
gon, it could distinguish Smith from the Sherbert line of cases in which
the claimants' conduct did not violate any state law.73 On remand, the
Oregon Supreme Court determined that the statute did not contain an
explicit exemption for religious peyote use, but held that the religious
use of peyote could not be criminally prohibited because it was pro-
tected by the United States Constitution. 74  The United States
Supreme Court again granted certiorari, this time to determine
whether Oregon could constitutionally prohibit the religious use of
peyote.75
The Court held that generally applicable criminal laws that inciden-
tally burden a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling state interest, 6 and that a state may prohibit the religious
use of peyote.77 The Court reasoned that the government's ability to
enforce prohibitions of socially harmful conduct cannot depend on the
68. Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1597.
69. The denial of benefits was based on Oregon Revised Statutes § 657.176, which provides,
in pertinent part, that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified from the receipt of benefits ... if...
the individual: (a) Has been discharged for misconduct connected with work .... OR. REV.
STAT. § 657.176(2)(a) (1987). Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 301 Or.
209, 215, 721 P.2d 445, 448 (1986) (Smith 1).
70. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 75 Or. App. 764, 709 P.2d 246
(1985) (Smith 11).
71. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 216-17, 721 P.2d
445, 449 (1986).
72. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 108 S. Ct. 1444, 1445 (1988)
(Smith III).
73. "The results we reached in Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie might well have been different if
the employees had been discharged for engaging in criminal conduct." Id. at 1451.
74. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 307 Or. 68, 73, 763 P.2d 146, 148
(1988) (Smith IP).
75. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (Smith P).
76. "To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' .
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." Id. at 1603.
77. Id. at 1606.
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religious beliefs of individuals."8 Yoder and Cantwell were distin-
guished as hybrid cases in which free exercise claims were asserted in
conjunction with other constitutional claims.7 9 The Court also held
that Sherbert was inapplicable to cases involving across-the-board
criminal prohibitions."0
Both the concurring opinion and the dissent disagreed with the
Court's decision to do away with the balancing process, which has
been the mainstay of free exercise jurisprudence for decades."1 Justice
O'Connor, concurring, argued that because the state's interest in regu-
lating the use of illegal drugs was so strong, the Court could have
reached the same result under the balancing test.82 The dissent, on the
other hand, concluded that the balancing process would have resulted
in an exemption for Smith.83
II. PROTECTING THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
THROUGH MANDATORY ACCOMMODATION
After Smith, courts will not mandate exemptions from across-the-
board criminal laws on the basis of the free exercise clause alone.
Because the majority strongly indicated that this holding will be
applied to other generally applicable laws as well as to criminal laws,
Smith is likely to have far-reaching consequences.84 According to the
Court, a state prohibits the free exercise of religion only when it crimi-
nally prohibits a religious act with discriminatory intent.8 5 Under this
holding, a criminal law will be upheld regardless of its devastating
effect on a religion, provided there is no evidence of discriminatory
intent on the part of the state.8 6
The Court has essentially determined that religious conduct that is
burdened by generally applicable criminal laws is no longer entitled to
constitutional protection. Thus, the progress which the Court made in
previous years towards protecting individual freedom in this area has
78. Id at 1603.
79. Id. at 1601.
80. Id. at 1603.
81. Id. at 1606-07.
82. Id. at 1614.
83. Id. at 1622-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. "The rule respondents favor [that the state be required to demonstrate a compelling
interest] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.... The First Amendment's protection of religious
liberty does not require this." Id. at 1605-06.
85. Id at 1599.
86. Id. As Justice O'Connor noted, however, "few States would be so naive as to enact a law
directly prohibiting or burdening a religious practice as such." Id. at 1608.
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been reversed. Despite the difficulties involved in court-mandated
exemptions, religious freedom requires and deserves the kind of pro-
tection that only courts are able to give. Consequently, the Court's
decision to retreat from this area poses a threat to religious freedom.
A. The Importance of Protecting Religious Freedom
As in the Court's early free exercise opinions, the Court in Smith
underprotects religious conduct by restrictively interpreting the scope
of the free exercise clause.8 7 This underprotection is inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights, which embodied the nation's commitment to
respecting cultural and religious diversity by limiting the government's
ability to discriminate against minority groups.88 Because the nation's
founders recognized that legislatures have no place in matters of indi-
vidual conscience,89 the Bill of Rights was enacted to protect certain
areas from politics, including "[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly,
and other fundamental rights."9
Although the precise intentions of the first amendment's authors are
unclear, most scholars agree that they intended the words "free exer-
cise of religion" to include both religious beliefs and acts of worship.9
As the Court noted in Yoder, "there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the
power of the state to control, even under regulations of general appli-
cability."92 Religious worship includes acts such as attending services,
praying, proselytizing, and ingesting sacramental substances. Because
most religious groups consider these acts a vital part of the expression
of their religious beliefs, a society that seeks to promote religious
diversity must also be willing to accommodate religious practices to
the greatest extent possible. The approach used in Sherbert and Yoder
reflected this belief.93
87. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.s. 145 (1878)).
88. J. Norgren & S. Nanda, American Cultural Pluralism and Law 2 (1988).
89. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 8, at 1579-80.
90. Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Jackson in West
Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
91. See, e.g., Adams and Emmerich, supra note 8, at 1599; Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1608
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
93. See Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The compelling interest test
effectuates the First Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that
it occupies a preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this
liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling governmental
interests 'of the highest order.' ") (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
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B. Problems With Allowing Only Legislatures to Grant Exemptions
The Court in Smith recognized that exemptions may be desirable in
some cases, but concluded that legislatures, rather than courts, were
better able to grant them.94 Although the Court did not specify the
reasons for this decision, there are a number of practical advantages to
voluntary legislative exemptions. Arguably, legislative exemptions are
more flexible than court-mandated exemptions because they do not
have the "crippling effect" on the government's ability to function that
mandated exemptions may have.95 Also, legislative errors are easier to
correct than judicial errors because legislatures are not required to
rely, at least formally, on precedent.96 Finally, legislatures may be in a
better position than courts to evaluate their own interests in denying
an exemption.97
Unfortunately, the practical advantages of voluntary legislative
accommodation do not outweigh the potential threat that minority
religions will face without a constitutional guarantee. Provided that
legislatures are willing to grant exemptions, legislative accommodation
may well be more practical than court-mandated accommodation.
When, however, a legislature refuses to accommodate a seriously bur-
dened religious practice, courts should have the authority to step in
and mandate an exemption.
Under the Smith holding, the protection granted to religious con-
duct that is burdened by a criminal law will depend entirely on a legis-
lature's sensitivity to minority religions and its commitment to
individual freedom. The Court in Smith states that this sensitivity is a
sufficient guarantee for these groups.
Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the
press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively
foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that
believes in the negative protection accorded religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.98
The Court admitted that legislatures may not adequately protect
minority religions, but dismissed the "relative disadvantage" that
94. Id. at 1606.
95. "Given the numerous opportunities for conflict between faith and government, the Free
Exercise Clause would become a serious infringement on the government's ability to perform its
functions were the Clause not confined to the most serious burdens on religious exercise ......
McConnell, supra note 6, at 30.
96. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law,
98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989).
97. McConnell, supra note 7, at 31.
98. Smith V, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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minority religions will have in the legislative forum as an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government."99  Thus, although legisla-
tures can be expected to protect religion, they cannot, by the Court's
own words, be expected to protect all religions equally. By admitting
the difficulties that its decision will cause for some religions but refus-
ing to intervene, the Court demonstrates a lack of commitment to reli-
gious liberty.
To support its reliance on legislative protection of religious beliefs,
the Court points to the fact that some states have enacted exemptions
for Native American Church peyote use into their drug laws.l °" These
exemptions, however, provide little relief to a member of the Native
American Church who wishes to use peyote but lives in a state with-
out an exemption. This individual will be faced with the choice of
abandoning his or her religion, practicing it illegally under the threat
of criminal sanctions, or moving to a place where Native American
Church peyote use is legal. If the goals of religious pluralism and tol-
erance are to be taken seriously, unnecessarily forcing an individual to
either relocate or abandon a religious belief is not a reasonable alterna-
tive. The rule, as announced in Sherbert and Yoder, should be to grant
an exemption unless the state's interest is so compelling that the
exemption is simply not possible.
By restricting the scope of the free exercise clause, the Court has
severely diminished religion's preferred constitutional status and has
placed it alongside other private interests, where it must lobby for leg-
islative favor. Although legislative exemptions may have some practi-
cal advantages over court-mandated exemptions, the Smith holding
will create unnecessary hardship for some religious groups whose
practices are seriously burdened by criminal laws. The Court's indif-
ference to the problems that these groups may face is inconsistent with
a broad interpretation of the guarantees embodied in the Bill of
Rights.
C. Making the Balancing Test More Fair: Weighing the Competing
Interests
The balancing test which the Court abandoned in Smith can provide
a much better means of protecting religious conduct than the volun-
tary legislative exemptions recommended by the Court. Because the
balancing approach has a seemingly infinite number of variables, how-
99. Id.
100. See. e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-
317(3) (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989).
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ever, it has been criticized for allowing the values of individual justices
to play a larger role in the decision than is desirable.10 1 This problem
can be eliminated by consistently framing the state's interest narrowly
and by examining the nature of the burden on the claimant's religion.
By following these objective guidelines, the Court can avoid underpro-
tecting minority religions, 102 and can ensure that seriously burdened
religious conduct will be protected so long as the state's interests in
denying an exemption are not sufficiently compelling.
1. Framing the State's Interest Narrowly
As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent in Smith, one way to
ensure that the balancing test is fair to free exercise claimants is to
consistently frame the state's interest narrowly.10 3 The proper ques-
tion to be asked in free exercise cases is not whether the state has an
interest in regulating the conduct in general, but rather, what is the
state's interest in refusing an exemption in a particular case. In Yoder,
for example, the proper question was not whether the state had an
interest in universal education but rather, whether that interest was
sufficiently compelling in the specific case of the Amish. 1" The state
undoubtedly has a strong interest in mandatory education, but in the
case of the Amish this interest seems considerably less compelling
because of the community's isolation from society and the Amish
belief in training their own children. 0" By framing the state's interest
narrowly, the Court views it on a level consistent with the claimant's
interest, thereby setting the stage for a fair evaluation of both.106
In the case of Native American Church peyote use, if the state's
interest is viewed broadly as "fighting the war on drugs,"107 any claim
101. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1712
(1987) ("The malleability of the balancing test permits commentators to assert confidently that
the Court can arrive at almost any result given a distinctive set of facts.") [hereinafter
Developments].
102. The Court's consistent refusal to exempt members of the Native American Church may
indicate discrimination against the Church and its values. See idL at 1734. On the other hand, in
Yoder the Court spoke favorably of the Amish when it described their way of life as "virtuous
and admirable." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
103. "Failure to reduce the competing interests to the same plane of generality tends to
distort the weighing process in the State's favor." Smith V 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1617 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228-29; see supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding and reasoning in Yoder).
105. See id at 212-13.
106. See Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. "It is not the State's broad interest in fighting the critical 'war on drugs' that must be
weighed against respondents' claim, but the State's narrow interest in refusing to make an
exception for the religious, ceremonial use of peyote." Id. at 1617 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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for exemption to any drug law presumably would be denied. This
broad framing of the state's interest creates images of gang warfare
and crack houses that are far removed from the peyote rituals of the
Native American Church. In essence, it gives the state's interest a
sense of urgency and importance that is unwarranted in the case of
peyote use. If, however, the state's interest is framed narrowly as an
interest in prohibiting this particular group from using this particular
drug, the Court must then look at factors that might make the state's
interest less compelling in the case of the Native American Church.
Upon examination of the Native American Church's peyote use, the
state's interest in denying an exemption appears to be considerably less
compelling than it would be in the case of other drug use. Peyote is a
strong hallucinogen, but its potential harmful effects to users are mini-
mized by the controlled setting in which it is used by the Native
American Church."'8 Further, the Church strictly regulates the time
and place of use so that other members of society are not threatened in
any way, 10 9 and there is virtually no trafficking in peyote, unlike in
most other illegal drugs."o
Although in most cases the state's interest will be sufficiently com-
pelling to override the claimant's interest in using illegal drugs, in the
case of Native American Church peyote use it may not be.I" Regard-
less of the outcome of the balancing process, however, claimants
should be permitted to demonstrate individual circumstances that
might make the state's interest weaker as applied to them. Framing
the state's interest narrowly in this manner allows them to do so.
2. Careful Consideration of the Burden on the Claimant
In addition to framing the state's interest narrowly, courts must also
carefully consider the nature of the burden on the claimant in order to
properly weigh the competing interests." 2 This inquiry should take
into account both objective circumstances, such as the nature of the
108. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-73
(1964).
109. See Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1926 (1990) (quoting a DEA Final Order). In Olsen, the Court noted that
Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church members were encouraged to smoke marijuana continuously,
thus posing a possible danger to the community. Id. at 1462.
110. Between 1980 and 1987, 19.4 pounds of peyote were seized by the DEA, as compared to
15,302,468.7 pounds of marijuana. Id. (quoting a DEA Final Order); see also Smith V, 110 S. Ct.
at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. See Smith V 110 S. Ct. at 1621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. "[T]he nature of the burden is relevant to, the standard the government must meet to
justify the burden." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707 (1986).
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penalty being imposed on the claimant, and subjective circumstances,
such as the importance of the practice to the claimant's religion. The
subjective part of this inquiry should be based solely on the claimant's
own assertions regarding his or her religion, provided there is no evi-
dence of insincerity.
The Court has recently declined to make this kind of inquiry into
the burden. Although the Court correctly refuses to question the
truth of religious beliefs, I 3 it has recently carried this prohibition even
further, refusing to inquire into religious beliefs or practices in any
way." 4 In United States v. Lee, "' for example, to avoid inquiring into
the religious practice, the Court accepted the claimant's assertion that
a burden existed and then proceeded to determine whether that bur-
den was justified by a state interest.1 16
Although at first glance the Court's acceptance of the assertion of a
burden without further investigation seems to aid the claimant's case,
it may ultimately disadvantage the claimant in the balancing pro-
cess. 1 7 If the Court gives a detailed account of the state interests and
then weighs these interests against a vague, undefined burden, the state
will be more likely to prevail.' 18 Without an understanding of the
nature or severity of the burden, the Court cannot assess its weight
and consequently cannot properly balance it against the state's
interests.
To avoid these problems, the Court should accept the claimant's
assertions of a burden, but should also make an attempt to understand
the nature of the burden. Because of the very personal nature of reli-
gious beliefs, the Court should rely on the claimant's own interpreta-
tions of his or her religion, provided there is no evidence of insincerity.
This limited inquiry would take into account factors such as the mean-
ing that the claimant attaches to the practice and the centrality of the
practice to the overall belief system.' 19
113. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
114. See, eg., Smith V, 110 S. Ct. at 1604 ("Repeatedly and in many different contexts we
have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a
religion or the plausibility of a religious claim."); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
115. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
116. Id. at 257; see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding
and reasoning in Lee).
117. Some authors have advocated a subjective approach to burden analysis. See, eg., Smith,
Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 296 (1987).
118. See, e-g., Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-60 (in which the Court accepts the claimant's burden with
virtually no discussion and then describes the state interests in detail).
119. See Brown, Religion: The Psychedelic Perspective: The Freedom of Religion Defense, 11
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 125, 133 (1983).
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Wisconsin v. Yoder' 20 demonstrates the advantage that this type of
inquiry gives to the claimant. In Yoder, the Court gave a detailed
account of the negative impact that compulsory high school attend-
ance would have on the Amish community, including a discussion of
Amish beliefs and values. 2 ' Through this examination of the Amish
religion, the Court was able to understand the importance of the
claimants' interests.
Had a balancing approach been used in Smith, an inquiry into the
burden would have considered factors such as the severity of the crim-
inal sanctions placed on the practice and the importance of peyote use
to the religion. Criminal sanctions are the most severe penalty a state
can place on a religious practice, since the claimant may risk imprison-
ment or other severe penalties by engaging in the practice.' 22 Thus,
prior to Smith, criminal laws were generally subject to more careful
scrutiny than other laws that imposed less direct and less severe bur-
dens.' 23 An analysis of the importance of peyote use to the Native
American Church would have revealed that peyote is to some extent
its "theological heart." '24 By taking these kinds of facts into account,
in addition to framing the state's interest narrowly, the Court can pro-
vide a fair and even-handed approach to claims for religious
exemptions.
3. The Balancing Test Applied to the Facts of Smith
Following the guidelines set forth above, a balancing test applied to
the facts of Smith would reveal that a state may not constitutionally
prohibit the sacramental use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church. Applied to the specific circumstances of the
Church, the state's interest in denying an exemption for the Church's
peyote use is fairly weak. Due to the controlled setting of the
120. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
121. See id. at 210-11; see also supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing Yoder).
122. "A State that makes criminal an individual's religiously motivated conduct burdens that
individual's free exercise of religion in the severest manner possible, for it 'results in the choice to
the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.'"
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1610 (1990) (Smith P)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04
(1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
124. "Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to bread and wine in certain
Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship;
prayers are directed to it much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost." People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1964); see also Developments, supra note
101, at 1735 (arguing that because Native Americans do not rank the importance of rituals,
courts should more generously assess the centrality of practices to the Native American Church).
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Church's peyote use and the minimal amount of trafficking in peyote,
Smith's use of peyote presented very little threat either to himself or
the community.
125
On the other hand, peyote is the "theological heart" of the Native
American Church, and criminal sanctions are the most severe restric-
tion that a state can place on an individual's conduct. 126 Therefore,
Smith's interest in obtaining an exemption was strong. Because the
burden on Smith's rights to freely exercise his religion far outweighed
the state's interest in denying him an exemption, the result should
have been that the state could not constitutionally prohibit Smith's
religious use of peyote.
III. CONCLUSION
When an individual's religious practices conflict with a generally
applicable law, either the individual's interests or the state's interests
will necessarily have to give way to the other. Although in many cases
individual rights must be subordinated to the law in order to protect
the public health, safety, or welfare, certain situations exist in which
these rights will overcome the state's interests. The balancing
approach, applied in the manner set forth above, can provide. a fair
and consistent means of determining which interests, the state's or the
individual's, should prevail.
Because the Smith rule does not protect against unnecessary
infringements on individual rights by generally applicable laws, it
poses a potential threat to religious liberty in the United States. Legis-
latures should be permitted to grant exemptions, but where a legisla-
ture needlessly refuses to accommodate a seriously burdened religious
practice, courts must have the authority and the willingness to step in
and mandate an exemption. The failure of the Smith Court to provide
this kind of guarantee will undoubtedly result in the unwarranted and
arbitrary suppression of some minority religious practices.
Danielle A. Hess
125. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
